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Stern and his critics on discounting and climate change
The Stern Review of the economics of climate change (Stern 2007) has had a 
substantial impact on public debate over policy responses to climate change. This is in 
part a matter of timing. Although economists have analyzed issues related to climate 
change for years, this discussion has been overshadowed by debate over scientific issues, 
initially  among  climate  scientists  and  then,  for  much  of  the  last  decade,  between 
scientists  and  political  critics  of  climate  science,  primarily  associated  with  US-based 
think  tanks.  Although  disputes  continue,  serious  debate  about  the  reality  of  global 
warming has ended. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC 2007a) has indicated, with more than 90 per cent probability, 
that human-caused emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases were 
primarily responsible for observed and projected global warming.
The Stern Review was undertaken by Sir Nicholas Stern at the request of the 
Treasury of the United Kingdom. Stern’s report was released in November 2006, and 
subsequently  published  as  Stern  (2007).  Stern  changed  the  terms  of  the  debate  by 
presenting  the  issues  in  economic  rather  than  scientific  terms.  The  effects  of  global 
warming, previously discussed in qualitative terms, were argued by Stern to correspond 
to large losses in economic welfare. 
Some aspects of the Stern Review have been accepted with little controversy. 
Most  significantly,  the  estimate  (p.  xvi)  that  stabilising  global  atmospheric  CO2-
equivalent concentrations in the range 500–550 parts per million (ppm) would reduce 
world consumption by around 1 per cent has been generally accepted as reasonable, if 
somewhat  optimistic.  For  comparison,  the  IPCC  (2007b,  p.  27)  gives  cost  estimates 
ranging from slightly negative to 4 per cent of global income to achieve stabilisation in a 
range of 535–590 CO2 equivalent ppm. These relative modest estimates contrast with 
political  discussion  of  mitigation  policies,  which  has  commonly  presupposed  much 
larger, though vaguely specified, economic costs.
There has also been little discussion of the Stern Review’s projections of climate 
change,  which  generally  followed  those  of  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate 
Change (2007a) or of estimates of the economic value of damage to natural ecosystems, 
which broadly followed those of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). Nordhaus and Boyer have 
been criticised for undervaluing damage to natural environments (Quiggin 2006), and a 
similar  undervaluation  is  evident  in  Stern  (Neumayer  2007).  There  has  been  some 
criticism of Stern’s estimates of impacts on human population, mainly on the grounds 1
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that Stern underestimates the potential for adaptation.
The main focus of discussion of the Stern Review has been the way in which 
future costs and benefits have been converted to present values through discounting. 
Stern’s approach to discounting has been criticised by a number of economists including 
Dasgupta (2006), Nordhaus (2006), Tol and Yohe (2006) and Yohe (2006) as well as by 
popular writers such as Lomborg (2006). More favourable assessments include DeLong 
(2006) and Weitzman (2007a).
This review will focus on the question of discounting. The paper begins with an 
outline of the expected utility model used in the Stern Review. Next, the question of 
‘inherent  discounting’,  that  is,  the  idea  that  future  outcomes  should  be  discounted 
simply  because  they  are  in  the  future,  is  examined,  along  with  the  closely  related 
concept  of  the  pure  rate  of  time  preference.  This  discussion  forms  the  basis  for  an 
assessment of the approaches to discounting and climate change adopted by the Stern 
Review and by its critics.
Expected utility
Stern, like most contributors to the debate over discounting and climate change, 
uses a model based on expected utility theory. There are good reasons for this. First, 
expected utility has the property of dynamic consistency, which means that, if you make 
a plan, anticipating all possible contingencies, you will want to continue with that plan 
over time, whichever contingency arises. No other choice model has this property except 
under special conditions.
Second,  expected  utility  theory  allows  a  single  utility  function  that 
simultaneously  determines  attitudes  to  intertemporal  wealth  transfers,  interpersonal 
redistribution and risk reduction (transfers of income and consumption between states 
of the world). Under a plausible technical assumption, broadly supported by empirical 
evidence (Pålsson 1996), all of these attitudes are determined by a single parameter, 
denoted η (eta) in the Stern Review, which measures the reciprocal of the elasticity of 
substitution for consumption. 
The technical requirement, referred to as constant relative risk aversion, is that 
attitudes to risk, expressed in terms of proportions of income, should be independent of 
income  levels.  So,  if  a  typical  individual  with  a  low  income  by  current  standards  is 
unwilling to accept a bet offering equal chances of a 100 per cent increase in income and 
a  50  per  cent  reduction,  the  same  should  be  true  for  typical  individuals  with  high 
incomes  and  for  people  in  the  future  when  average  incomes  are  likely  to  be  higher. 




The  central  idea  of  expected  utility  theory  is  that  people  are  not  concerned 
ultimately  with  money  income  but  with  the  utility  derived  from  consumption.  The 
assumption  of  diminishing  marginal  utility  means  that  a  dollar  of  extra  income  or 
consumption is worth less for rich people than for poor people. So:
(i) assuming rising incomes, a dollar of extra income is worth less in the future 
than it is today;
(ii) under uncertainty, a dollar of extra income in a bad (low consumption) state 
of the world is worth more than a dollar in a good (high consumption) state of the world; 
and
(iii)  transferring  income  from  rich  people  to  poor  people  improves  aggregate 
welfare.
The first assumption means that, in the presence of technological progress that 
allows rising incomes and consumption, we would expect a positive discount rate; that 
is, a given increment to money income should be worth less in the future than in the 
present. The second means that a risky asset (more precisely, a risky asset with returns 
that are correlated with aggregate consumption) should be worth less than a riskless 
asset, since it yields high returns when the marginal utility of income is low and vice 
versa. The third means that even when redistributive taxes and international aid are 
costly (for practical purposes, nearly always) they can improve welfare.
Assuming  that  the  combination  of  the  expected  utility  model  and  inherent 
discounting (discussed below) captures all the issues under consideration, the riskless 
social discount rate is determined by a simple formula
r = δ + η*g, (1)
where g is the rate of growth of consumption per person, and δ is the inherent discount 
rate, discussed below.   A similar, slightly more complex formula can be used to derive 
the rate of return for a risky asset, based on its correlation with aggregate consumption.
The parameter η, the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, represents 
the  proportional  rate  at  which  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption  is  reduced  as 
consumption increases. The choice of η is central to the debate over discounting. The 
larger is η, the stronger all of effects (i)–(iii) become. So high values of η imply a high 
preference  for  current  consumption,  high  aversion  to  risk  and  large  benefits  from 
redistribution.
Even  economists  familiar  with  the  mathematical  derivation  of  η   often  have 
problems  understanding  the  implications  of  different  choices  of  η,  particularly  when 
time,  uncertainty  and  interpersonal  redistribution  interact.  So  it  may  be  useful  to 
consider the most common single choice,  η = 1, which is used in the Stern Review.3
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The special case η = 1
Expected utility theory was first developed to analyse choice under uncertainty. 
In  discussions  focused  on  risk,  the  most  common  single  parametric  choice  is  η = 1, 
corresponding to a logarithmic utility function of the form u = log(c) where u is utility, c 
is  consumption  and  log  is  the  natural  logarithm.  This  is  a  particularly  tractable 
function, which also gains popularity from tradition, having been proposed as a utility 
function for money by Bernoulli (1738/1954). Arrow (1971) also suggested, on theoretical 
grounds, that η should be approximately 1. 
Subsequent empirical evidence has been mixed. The assumption of logarithmic 
utility (η = 1) seems to give a good match for calibrated macroeconomic models designed 
to match growth and business cycle facts (Gomme and Rupert 2005). By contrast, data 
on the equity premium, discussed below, is often taken to imply that the value of η must 
be greater than 1. Estimates based on observations of labour market responses to risk 
suggest values of η around 0.5 (Kaplow 2005).
The range of values observed in different fields suggests that Stern’s choice of 
η = 1 is a reasonable compromise. On the other hand, it implies that an expected utility 
model with a single value for η = 1 is unlikely to match all the available data. Thus for 
any choice of parameters, it will be possible to point to contrary evidence.
There is a natural way of interpreting logarithmic utility in the intertemporal 
context. With this specification (and ignoring inherent discounting as discussed below) 
one per cent of consumption now has the same value as one per cent of consumption at 
any time in the future. So, for example, a policy that reduced consumption (not the rate   
of growth of consumption!) by one percentage point from 2000 to 2050, relative to some 
baseline, then increased consumption by one per cent relative to the same baseline until 
2100, would come out exactly neutral. Logarithmic utility is implicit in much discussion 
of  intergenerational  equity,  notably  the  intergenerational  accounting  analysis 
popularised by Kotlikoff and Burns (2004), which focuses on the proportion of income 
paid in tax by each generation.
At this point a numerical example might be useful. The world’s mean income per 
person is currently around $US7000, though the majority of people get much less and 
the billion or so in rich countries much more. Under the projections used in the Stern 
Review, average world income in 2100 is estimated at about $US 100 000. Consumption 
is approximately equal to income, and in what follows, these numbers will be treated as 
consumption levels.
With logarithmic utility, a sacrifice of $70 per person (1 per cent of consumption) 
today  would  be  justified  if  (and  only  if)  it  increased  the  consumption  of  our  great-
grandchildren in 2100 by at least $1000. If this trade-off appears reasonable, then a 4
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value of η =1 is appropriate. If the future payoff required is higher (or lower) then so is 
the preferred value of η. 
Intuition about the far future tends to be cloudy, so it is worth observing that, 
under  expected  utility  theory,  exactly  the  same  arguments  apply  to  redistribution 
within the current generation. To illustrate, it is useful to turn around the direction of 
redistribution. Consider a redistributive program that takes $1000 from the well-off (in 
this example households with income of $100 000 per person) and uses the proceeds to 
benefit  the  poor  (those  with  $7000  per  person).  (Alternatively  to  keep  the  focus  on 
redistribution from the poor to the rich, suppose that such a program already exists, and 
consider scrapping it.)
Such redistribution always involves a range of costs including administration, 
compliance, efforts at avoidance and evasion, and incentive costs. Suppose that, in a 
particular case, these costs amount to 93 cents per dollar initially taxed, so that for a net 
loss of $1000 to the well-off, the net benefit to the poor is $70. If such a program is 
exactly marginal, so that any program with a larger net benefit is acceptable, and any 
program with a smaller net benefit is unacceptable, then the implied social preferences 
have η = 1. If the minimum acceptable net benefit is larger (smaller), then we require η 
to be less than (greater than one).
Problems with expected utility
The  expected  utility  model  is  neat,  logically  compelling  and  tractable,  but  it 
suffers  from  two  big  problems.  First,  at  least  some  of  the  time,  most  people  do  not 
behave in a way that is consistent with the expected utility model. For example, people 
simultaneously  gamble  at  unfavorable  odds  and  take  out  costly  insurance,  which 
violates the predictions of expected utility theory with respect to uncertainty. 
In decisions under uncertainty, individuals often seem to put more weight on 
low-probability extreme outcomes than would be implied by expected utility (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Although various responses to this observation have been proposed, 
the most popular has been to use a rank-dependent weighting scheme, as proposed by 
Quiggin (1981, 1982, 1993) and incorporated in the cumulative prospect theory model of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
Weitzman  (2007a)  observes  that  placing  a  high  weight  on  extreme  outcomes 
may be sensible in the presence of structural uncertainty about parameters such as the 
sensitivity of climate to increased CO2 emissions. He shows that, with an underlying 
lognormal probability distribution, such uncertainty gives rise to ‘fat-tailed’ subjective 5
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probability  distributions  with  unbounded  means,  so  that  evaluations  of  uncertain 
choices are dominated entirely by events in the tail of the distribution. Bounding the 
worst-case outcome using economic estimates of the value of statistical lives allows the 
derivation of finite evaluations of alternative policies, but these still require a very high 
weight on extreme outcomes. In the case of climate change, only the right-hand (high-
warming) tail of the distribution is relevant, since events in the left tail correspond to 
little or no change in global average temperature.
Similar kinds of problems arise in discounting over time. People often apply a 
high discount rate to trades between the present and the near future, but a low discount 
rate for trades between the near and far future. This is called hyperbolic discounting. 
Substantial bodies of literature on generalised expected utility theory and behavioural 
economics attempt to address this problem, as discussed below.
The second problem is that observed market outcomes are not consistent with 
expected utility theory as it is commonly applied. This problem is partly because people 
do not act in accordance with expected utility theory and partly because markets do not 
work in the smooth and frictionless way assumed in standard finance theory models.
The most important problem in this respect is the ‘equity premium puzzle’, and 
the closely related ‘risk-free rate puzzle’. The equity premium puzzle, first observed by 
Mehra and Prescott (1985), is that, for plausible choices of η, the real bond rate should 
be somewhat higher than it is, and the rate of return to equity substantially lower. 
Historically,  real  returns  to  investors  from  the  purchases  of  US  government 
bonds  have  been  estimated  at  one  percent  per  year,  while  real  returns  from  stock 
(‘equity’) in US companies have been estimated at seven percent per year, a difference of 
six percentage points. By contrast, for reasonable choices of η, the difference should be 
no more than half a percentage point. The equity premium puzzle can be resolved by 
assuming very high values of η since risk aversion increases the premium. But high 
values of η imply a high discount rate, so the risk-free rate puzzle is made worse. 
As is noted by Grant and Quiggin (2005), failure to take account of the equity 
premium  puzzle  can  lead  to  mistaken  and  inconsistent  policy  judgements.  The 
inconsistencies  between  the  expected  utility  model  and  observed  choices  and  market 
outcomes  mean  that,  for  any  possible  choice  of  parameters,  it  is  possible  to  present 
hypothetical choices for which most people will reject the implications of the model, or to 
point  to  market  outcomes  inconsistent  with  the  proposed  parameters.  In  these 
circumstances, using expected utility theory to derive policy implications from particular 




Inherent discounting and weighting
Although  expected  utility  provides  a  complete  theory  of  allocation  of 
consumption  across  individuals,  time  periods  and  states  of  the  world,  it  is  often 
supplemented by some sort of weighting scheme. This is true whether expected utility is 
used  positively,  to  model  actual  behaviour,  or  normatively  as  a  guide  to  rational 
individual decisionmaking and ethical social decisionmaking.
In the case of allocating consumption over time we need to consider whether we 
should discount future consumption simply because it is in the future, even with the 
same marginal utility. Such discounting is represented by the term δ in equation (1).
The parameter δ is commonly referred to as the ‘pure rate of time preference’, 
but usage of this term is not consistent, and some writers use it to refer to the rate of 
discount for monetary flows (r in equation (1)). Hence, in this paper the term ‘inherent 
discounting’ will be used.
Inherent discounting
One of the longest running controversies in welfare economics has concerned the 
appropriateness of applying different weights to people in different generations, and, 
more generally of discounting future utility whoever receives it. Ramsey (1928), whose 
work is the starting point for formal analysis of intertemporal choices, rejected inherent 
discounting as ethically unjustified, and this viewpoint is shared by most philosophical 
advocates of utilitarianism. On the other hand, a good deal of evidence suggests that 
individuals tend to discount their own future consumption.
Before  discussing  inherent  discounting,  it  is  worth  observing  that  standard 
expected utility theory suggests one reason for discounting future consumption; namely 
the possibility that we will not be around to enjoy it. As individuals, we face a typical 
annual mortality risk of around 1 per cent, and it makes sense to discount future utility 
by this amount. But at least some of the time people (most notably teenagers) discount 
the future much more than this. 
For society as a whole, there is a comparable risk arising from the possibility of 
nuclear  annihilation,  a  killer  meteor  and  so  on.  The  risk  need  not  involve  a  total 
extinction of the species; it is sufficient that the disaster be great enough that ‘all bets 
are off’ in terms of calculations about the future. 
With this point addressed, there remains the question of whether we do and 7
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should, discount future utility. The evidence on individual behaviour is far from clear. 
On the one hand, there is a lot of evidence to support the idea of ‘hyperbolic discounting’. 
However, this is offset by a notion of ‘mental accounts’ (Thaler 1990). Individuals may 
allocate resources between activities and follow inconsistent rules in different activities. 
For  example,  the  same  person  may  allocate  money  to  an  automatic  saving  scheme 
offering low or even negative real returns, while displaying hyperbolic discounting with 
respect to the remaining cash flow.
Leaving such phenomena to one side, the evidence for high inherent rates of 
discount  is  not  strong.  The  most  obvious  market  measure  to  use  in  assessing 
intertemporal tradeoffs is the real rate of interest on low-risk bonds (government or 
AAA  corporate).  This  rate  has  generally  been  between  one  and  two  per  cent  and  is 
currently around two per cent. Given that the rate of growth of average consumption per 
person is between one and two per cent, this is consistent with zero discounting and 
η = 1.
Even if individuals do display inherent discounting, that does not necessarily 
mean  that  this  is  appropriate  as  a  basis  for  social  decisions.  Future  individuals 
presumably will not share the view that utility in our time is inherently more valuable 
than  utility  in  theirs.  In  fact,  as  individuals,  introspection  and  casual  observation 
suggest that we generally regret decisions made in the past on the basis of inherent 
discounting. Such decisions represent selfishness on the part of our past selves at the 
expense of our current selves, analogous to individual selfishness with respect to others.
The case against inherent discount is summarised by DeLong (2006)1:
A δ of 3% per year is unconscionable--it means that somebody 
born in 1970 "counts" for twice as much as somebody born in 
1995, who in turn "counts" for twice as much as somebody born 
in 2020.
A crucial point, often overlooked in discussions of intergenerational equity is that 
members of different generations are alive at the same time. Any policy that discounts 
future utility must discriminate not merely against generations yet  unborn but against 
the current younger generation, 
Stern and the critics
The analysis in the Stern Review follows the general approach set out above. 
The value of η is set to 1, which is, as noted above, the most common single choice for 
1  A numerical error in the original statement of this point has been corrected8
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this parameter. The value of δ is set to 0.001 (0.1 per cent), reflecting a rejection of 
inherent discounting, except insofar as it reflects the possibility of extinction. Similarly, 
there  are  no  interpersonal  weights,  but  changes  in  the  consumption  of  low-income 
individuals  and  countries  are  weighted  more  highly  at  the  margin  because  of  the 
assumed diminishing marginal utility of consumption.
In Stern’s analysis, the rate of growth of consumption, g, is derived from the 
economic scenarios. Typical values of g are between 1.5 per cent and 2 per cent, so the 
corresponding values of r are between 1.6 per cent and 2.1 per cent.
The effect of choosing η = 1 and δ near 0 is that concern for future generations 
extends more or less indefinitely into the future, when changes in welfare are expressed 
in terms of percentages of income or consumption. On the other hand, the discounted 
value of payments expressed in monetary terms declines quite fast. At a rate of 2.1 per 
cent,  a  dollar  of  (constant  price)  income  received  in  2100  is  worth  approximately  12 
cents today. A income stream of a dollar a year, received for a million years into the 
future is worth a little under $50.
Criticisms of δ 
One part of the debate over δ can be dismissed quickly. Many of the critics on 
this point have confused δ and r, apparently assuming that δ is a discount rate, rather 
than  a  measure  of  inherent  discounting,  which  is  only  part  of  the  discount  rate. 
Examples of this confusion include Lomborg (2006) and Leonhardt (2007). 
A similarly weak criticism is the observation that benefit–cost analysis of public 
investment proposals, including that undertaken by the UK Treasury, commonly uses 
discount rates higher than that considered by Stern (Tol 2006). This is a neat debating 
point, but has little practical relevance. The political structure of project appraisal is 
that estimates of costs and cash flows rely on inputs from project proponents that are 
almost  always  over-optimistic  (Flyvbjerg,  Bruzeliu  and  Rothengatter  2003)  Treasury 
controls the choice of discount rate and uses it to adjust for downside risk as well as for 
discounting. Hence, the official discount rate is substantially higher than the true social 
rate of discount.  The use of discount rates to adjust for risk in this way has long been 
recognised  as  inappropriate  (Little  and  Mirrlees)  but  persists  because  of  its  political 
convenience.
Among the more serious critics, both Nordhaus (2006) and Yohe (2006) focus on 
the sensitivity of the results to changes in the value of δ, but do not give any specific 
argument  for  inherent  discounting.  Yohe  does  not  present  any  argument  for  a  high 9
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value of δ, simply observing that others have used high rates.
Nordhaus (2006) cites earlier work (Nordhaus 1994; Nordhaus and Boyer 2000) 
in which the value δ = 0.03 (3 per cent) was derived as a residual. Nordhaus assumes 
that the discount rate r should match the observed rate of return to (debt and equity) 
capital,  and  that  this  rate  should  be  used  to  explain  observed  levels  of  aggregate 
savings. The historically observed average rate of return to capital is around 5.5 per 
cent. For reasons of technical tractability, Nordhaus chose to set η = 1. With an observed 
growth rate of consumption, g, of about 1.5 per cent, equation (1) implies that δ must be 
equal to 3 per cent. 
Such  an  analysis  implies  a  very  low  level  of  concern  for  our  descendants   
(certainly for anyone more than two generations removed from us). In the discounting 
procedure proposed by Nordhaus, the welfare of our great-grandchildren (whether or not 
they  have  yet  been  born)  has  about  a  tenth  the  weight  we  accord  ourselves.  Not 
surprisingly, this translates into a ‘do nothing now’ approach to global warming. 
Leaving  aside  the  ethical  difficulties  here,  Nordhaus’  analysis  fails  to  take 
account  of  the  equity  premium,  which  he  mentions  briefly  as  a  factor  that  can  be 
neglected. As was first pointed out by Cline (1991), if market rates of return are to be 
taken as correct measures of social welfare, the natural choice for the riskless discount 
rate  is  the  rate  of  interest  on  government  bonds,  which  has  historically  averaged 
between 1 and 2 per cent. Using this rate, equation (1) implies that δ must be close to 
zero. 
In the absence of any convincing justification for inherent discounting, the case 
for a low rate such as that chosen by Stern seems overwhelming. Hence, if there is a 
problem with the ultimate outcome it is necessary to look elsewhere in the analysis. 
From here on, the value of δ = 0.001 will be assumed, and discussion of the implications 
of other choices is conditional on this.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution
A  more  plausible  criticism  concerns  Stern’s  choice  of  η   and  suggestions  that 
higher  values  should  have  been  considered.  The  most  direct  criticism  is  that,  in  a 
growing economy, a low value of η underweights the welfare of the current generation, 
at the expense of succeeding generations who will be much richer. This point is made by 
Dasgupta (2006), who considers the case when society has available an unlimited supply 
of projects yielding a riskless rate of return of 4 per cent. As Dasgupta shows, with η = 1, 
the implied policy recommendation is that the vast majority of current income (around 10
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97.5 per cent) should be saved in order to allow for greater consumption in the future.
The underlying problem is observed by DeLong (2006). Looking at current rates 
of  savings  and  economic  growth,  Dasgupta’s  estimated  rate  of  return  to  marginal 
investment of 4 per cent seems conservative for a classical growth model based on factor 
accumulation. To achieve 1 per cent growth in consumption per person in such a model, 
it would be necessary to generate net additions to the capital stock equal to 25 per cent 
of total income each year (since 4 per cent of 25 per cent is 1 per cent). By contrast, 
China is achieving annual growth rates of around 8 per cent, with savings equal to 40 
per cent of economy. So the fact that we see more rapid growth with lower rates of net 
saving seems to imply that there must exist many projects with rates of return greater 
than or equal to 4 per cent.
However, once technical progress, generated either exogenously or through the 
existence of increasing returns to scale in knowledge, is taken into account, the picture 
changes radically. In the real economy, where most growth in consumption arises from 
technical progress, the optimal rate of saving is far lower than that derived by Dasgupta 
(2006).
A more direct way of refuting Dasgupta’s argument is to observe that the major 
premise  must  be  false.  If  there  existed  an  infinite  supply  of  projects  with  riskless 
returns of 4 per cent, the rate of return on riskless bonds would have to equal 4 per cent, 
rather than the 1 to 2 per cent observed in practice. Although this difference may appear 
small, it is critical in practice.
Criticism of the time horizon used in discounting
The most plausible criticism of low rates of discount is that they require us to 
take account of developments more than 100 years into the future about which we can 
in practice, know very little. This is a reasonable criticism, but its main effect is to point 
up the limitations of utilitarian benefit–cost analysis for a problem like global warming. 
We know that the effects of global warming will be felt far into the future. We 
can either mitigate these effects, at very modest cost to ourselves, or leave the problem 
to future generations. However, our understanding of the extent to which our current 
actions will cause damage that is irreparable, or very costly to correct, is limited once we 
extend  the  time  horizon  far  into  the  future.  There  is  no  easy  way  of  getting  useful 
probability and cost numbers here.
One partial solution might be to end the analysis at, say 2050 or 2100, with 
future effects being measured as a diminution in the capital stock (including natural 
capital). Although logically equivalent to the discounting procedure employed by Stern 11
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and his critics, this might turn out to be more tractable and intuitively comprehensible.
This issue has been addressed by Weitzman (2007b), who argues that Stern’s 
choice of a low discount rate and a long time horizon may be understood as a roundabout 
way of addressing the problem of irreducible uncertainty.
Concluding comments
Critics  of  the  Stern  Review,  such  as  Dasgupta  (2006),  Nordhaus  (2006),  and 
Yohe (2006) have relied mainly on the claim that the parameters used in discounting 
are extremely low, yielding implausible results. Stern’s specification of the elasticity of 
the marginal utility of consumption is standard, and both lower and higher values are 
commonly considered in sensitivity analysis. As a result, most controversy has centred 
on Stern’s choice of a very low rate of pure time preference. 
Stern’s  modelling  approach  is  primarily  the  result  of  applying  the  standard 
utilitarian  view  that  all  people  count  equally  and  that  there  is  no  justification  for 
treating people more favorably simply because they were born earlier. If this view is 
accepted, the pure rate of time discount is simply a device to take account of possibilities 
that would render all calculations irrelevant, such as a nuclear catastrophe. Since the 
probability of such an event in any given year is close to zero, the pure rate of time 
discount  must  be  similarly  close  to  zero.  Given  Stern’s  premises,  there  is  nothing 
remarkable about the parametric value of 0.1 per cent chosen to represent the pure rate 
of time discount.
As Weitzman (2007b) indicates, the real difficulty here is that the analytical 
methods  of  expected  utility  theory  are  ill-equipped  to  handle  issues  involving 
uncertainty about crucial parameters evolving over long periods of time. Yet there is no 
well-developed alternative.
In  analysing  such  problems  we  are  pushing  economic  analysis  to  its  limits.   
Economists  lack  an  analytical  procedure  to  deal  with  problems  involving  unforeseen 
outcomes, or even to explain the large price premium associated with risky investments 
such as corporate equity. While such basic problems remain unresolved, any choice of 
discounting procedure to assess long-term risks such as climate change will yield some 
implications  that  are  intuitively  unappealing  or  inconsistent  with  observed  market 
outcomes. Economists can help to define the issues, but it is unlikely that economics can 
provide a final answer.
Ultimately, the response to climate change is a social and political choice facing 
the global community, to be determined through processes such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change or, if such processes fail, through a default 12
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decision to do nothing. Stern and others have shown that the price of stabilising the 
global climate through economically efficient policies will be modest. The decision on 
whether to pay that price will determine, implicitly at least, whether the discount rates 
proposed  by  Stern  accurately  represent  the  collective  judgements  of  the  global 
community.
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